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Abstract
Using a newly collected dataset on inquisitorial activity for seven regions, fourteen
provinces and 947 municipalities, I analyze the long-term economic consequences of the
Spanish Inquisition (1478-1834). I show that inquisitorial activity is negatively associated
to regional and provincial economic growth (an increase of a thousand inquisitorial trials
is associated with 3% to 5% lower urbanization rates). At the municipal level, I find that
municipalities affected by the Inquisition experienced an annual population growth rate
0.11% lower than their counterparts. This result is robust when controlling for alternative
explanatory factors, such as pre-existent religiosity and proxies for trade activity. I ex-
plore three channels through which the Inquisition may have had an impact on economic
outcomes. While inquisitorial activity is not linked to levels of trust or social polarization,
I find it is negatively associated with the adoption of new technologies and the creation
of municipal centres of cultural transmission.
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1 Introduction
Pope Sixtus IV created the Spanish Inquisition (1478-1834) to persecute crypto-morality,
mainly judaizers and moriscos.1 While the main initial objective of the Pope was to pre-
serve religious unity in the kingdoms of Castile and Aragon, the Catholic King’s2 aim was
to obtain a unified kingdom using religion as an instrument (Ángel Alcalá, 1984). Because
the Pope did not have the control over the Inquisition, it soon became a political repressive
tool of the Spanish Crown from the second half of the 16th century onwards. The Spanish
Kings used the Inquisition, the first Spanish institution with the same de facto power on all
Spanish territories, to persecute political ideologies and behaviors that could jeopardize the
established structures of the kingdom (Haliczer, 1990; Vidal-Robert, 2013). Since its creation
in 1478, the Inquisition conducted more than 100,000 trials across all over Spanish territories
during the three hundred years of its existence. A natural question that arises is whether such
a repressive and persistent institution had any impact on economic development.
Using trial activity data on seven Spanish regions, fourteen Spanish provinces and the 947
municipalities in Catalonia, this paper examines the long-run effects of the Spanish Inquisition
on economic, political and cultural outcomes.
Specifically, I focus my analysis on Catalan municipalities to determine the effect of the
Inquisition on annual population growth, a proxy for economic development (Galor and Weil,
2000). Using population data from 1378 to 1991, I apply a differences-in-differences approach
(DID) to determine the effect of the Inquisition. In the baseline specification, I show that
inquisitorial activity decreased annual population growth by 0.11% in Catalan municipalities
that experienced at least one trial of the Inquisition. This effect, however, vanishes after the
first half of the 19th century. I include county fixed effects and year dummies, municipality
initial characteristics and allow the impact of these to vary year by year.
The main challenge of measuring the effect of the Inquisition on long-run development is
identification. For instance, the pre-existent religiosity of a village could have affected both
the activity of the Inquisition and economic outcomes. To address this issue, I control for the
1Judaizers were the Jews converted to Catholicism and Moriscos were Muslims converted to Catholicism.
2The Catholic Kings (Isabella I and Ferdinand I) were the Spanish kings when Pope Sixtus IV created the
Inquisition.
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type of jurisdiction of villages previous to the existence of the Inquisition. 3 When controlling
for Church jurisdiction the results remain unchanged. Therefore, pre-existent religiosity or
religious influence are not driving the results.
Historical proximity to commercial routes or centres (i.e. maritime ports, historical roads
and intersections) could be related to both inquisitorial activity and economic development.
For example, easy access to villages could facilitate inquisitorial activity as well as economic
activity. Omitting distance to Europe may also be problematic. Villages closer to Europe could
experience more inquisitorial activity because of higher influence of protestantism, which has
been linked to better economic outcomes (Becker and Woessmann, 2009). Results are robust
to the inclusion of data on Roman roads, intersections, maritime routes and ports, as well as
distance to France.
There is a large literature addressing how historical episodes or institutions have persistent
effects on current economic outcomes. Since Engerman and Sokoloff (1997) that focus on the
role factor endowments played on different economic paths and Acemoglu et al. (2001, 2002)
that explain the effect of colonial origins on current economic outcomes, more recent research
has focused on the impact of slave trade (Nunn, 2008), forced labor system (Dell, 2010).4 These
studies usually relate historical institutions or episodes to current outcomes assuming that the
effect found is persistent and consistent through all the period between them. Frankema
and van Waijenburg (2012), however, have recently shown that this may not be the case.
They present income estimates well above subsistence level for nine British African colonies
in 1880-1965. Therefore, they conclude that of the assumptions of structural impediments to
growth for Africa should be reconsidered. This paper can show the effects of the Inquisition
from its creation until nowadays taking advantage of population data availability for the 947
municipalities in Catalonia. In particular, I show that after a strong negative impact of the
Inquisition, its impact on economic growth smoothly decreases over time until it vanishes after
two hundred years approximately.
3Villages in early modern Spain were assigned different types of jurisdictions (Royal, Church, Order or
Noble); that is, the lord of a village could be either the King, a member of the Church, a member of the
nobility, or a military order.
4Nunn (2009), Spolaore and Wacziarg (2013) and Alesina and Giuliano (2013) provide a complete and
detailed review of this literature.
3
This paper is also related to the literature that focuses on how cultural transmission (may
have) had a direct effect on economic performance or (may have) generated barriers to the flow
of ideas and innovations, as described in Spolaore and Wacziarg (2013). Regarding the direct
effect, inquisitorial persecution may have led to an economic stagnation process in Spain due to
intergenerational transmission of traditional values opposite to new ideas and innovations. For
instance, Greif and Tadelis (2010) use a theoretical framework to explain how the persecution of
crypto-morality can lead to the decay of a particular moral in a society.5 Regarding barriers to
ideas, the Inquisition may have also created barriers to interactions between different religions
in Spain or Spanish thinkers and new knowledge spread in the rest of Europe.
I explore three possible channels through which the effect of the Inquisition could have
persisted over time and that are related to the description in Spolaore and Wacziarg (2013):
trust on institutions and between people, social polarization and culture (attitudes towards
new technologies and the spread of culture).
Inquisitorial trials were initiated after an anonymous accusation, whose author was never
made public. For this reason the effect of the Inquisition could have persisted through a lack of
trust not only between people but also a lack of trust towards Spanish institutions, following
the same type of argument as in Nunn and Wantchekon (2011). Using World Values Survey
(WVS) data and Centro de Investigaciones Sociologicas (CIS) surveys I show that there is no
significant correlation between the number of trials of the Inquisition and the levels of trust
between people.
Historians have often defined the persistence of the inquisitorial mind as the influence of
inquisitorial ideas and mentality to current society’s behavior, Ángel Alcalá (1984), Abellán
(1987) . In particular, they argue that the persecution of ideas that did not correspond to the
status quo could impact the levels of polarization in society. They define social polarization
as the existence of two main groups who would have opposite behaviors and would never
reach an agreement. I use political elections’ outcomes in the 19th century -as a proxy for
social polarization- to calculate polarization levels in Parliament and find no evidence of a
5Nonetheless, there are papers showing positive effects of culture or attitudes on growth. For example,
Becker and Woessmann (2009) and Botticini and Eckstein (2012) show how Jewish and Protestant regions
were more economically prosperous due to human capital formation.
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relationship with Inquisitorial activity to support this hypothesis.
Finally, I explore to what extent severe inquisitorial activity affected entrepreneurial be-
havior, technological innovation and culture. The fear of being punished by the inquisition
when proposing new ideas and innovations is likely to have negatively affected the willing-
ness to invest in new technologies. 6 Using WVS and CIS surveys between 2000 and 2007, I
show that indeed, there is a significant negative correlation between inquisitorial activity and
people’s attitudes towards new technologies.
However, these results do not provide any evidence for the period between the Inquisition
and the years of those surveys. Other shocks such as the Civil War (1936-1939) and the Spanish
dictatorship (1939-1975) could also affect these attitudes. To address this issue, I obtained data
on the number of patents produced by each Spanish region from 1850 onwards and information
on the existence of cultural centres in the province of Barcelona (340 municipalities) before
1930. I show that both number of patents and the likelihood of the existence of cultural centres
are negatively correlated with inquisitorial activity.
The results of this paper shed light on the long-run consequences of historical institutions.
In particular, my results show a negative impact of a repressive institution such as the Spanish
Inquisition on economic growth. However, this impact is not consistent and persistent over
time. Instead, it slowly decreased over time until it finally vanished after the first half of the
19th century. Interestingly enough, it is during this influence of the Spanish Inquisition on
economic growth that Catalonia industrialised. One question that arises, then, is whether the
Inquisition affected attitudes or cultural elements that led to the Industrial Revolution. The
evidence suggests that negative attitudes towards new technologies and culture arose where
inquisitorial activity was more severe.
2 Spanish Inquisition: Historical Background
Pope Sixtus IV created the Spanish Inquisition and ceded its control to the Spanish Crown
by issuing the papal bull Exigit sincerae devotionis in 1478. The first institution that had
uniform de facto power over all of the Spanish territory was just created. From then until its
6In fact, regions that were more affected by such repression seem to have adopted new technology later
during the Industrial Revolution than those regions that were less affected by it (Carla Rahn Phillips, 1997).
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definitive abolition in 1834, the Spanish Inquisition conducted more than 100,000 trials that
featured crypto-jews, crypto-muslims, crypto-lutherans and other assorted “heretics”.
Although originally the Inquisition was created to only persecute crypto-morality, it soon
became an ideological and political control instrument of the monarchs, Contreras (1987),
Bennassar (1987), Vidal-Robert (2013). The Inquisition was a centralised institution very well
connected to the Spanish political apparatus. In fact, the general inquisitor was an important
member of one of the most relevant political councils through which the Spanish King governed
his kingdom, the General Council of Castile, Escudero (1987). As a matter of fact, several
presidents of the Council of Castile were also general Inquisitors, either contemporaneously or
at a different time in their lives.7 Moreover, the General Council of the Inquisition became the
second most important political council of the kingdom. This Council ruled the Inquisition and
controlled its activities and finances in all regions of Spain. The Inquisition created territorial
units to better control and neutralize “the confused and variegated spatial and administrative
division that the state could not prevent”, Contreras (1987). The General Council of the
Inquisition supervised the activities of these territorial units and controlled their finances.
The Spanish monarchs used Catholicism, the Church of the state, as an excuse and the
Inquisition as an instrument to apply and enforce their unique criteria to all social, political and
ideological diversity of the Iberian peninsula. Anecdotal evidence shows how the Inquisition
would intervene in the case that people’s actions or behaviours interfered with the monarch’s
criteria. For instance, Haliczer (1990) describes how the King used the Inquisition to prohibit
the public exhibition of portraits of Padre Francisco Simon, a Valencian hero, or procession
or demonstration in favor of his beatification. Movements involving large numbers of people
created alarm within the monarchs because they could endanger royal authority. In a different
way, Millán (1984) describes how the King told the Inquisition not to persecute Dutch vessels
in their visit to Spain in 1650’s in order to improve commercial transactions in the peninsula.
7Here is the list of general inquisitors who contemporaneously were president of the Council of Castile:
Diego de Espinosa (1566), Juan Bautista de Acevedo (1608), Diego de Arce y Reinoso (1643) and Orbe y
Larreátegui (1727). Others occupied the presidency of the Council of Castile and the General Inquisitor
position at different points in time. Those are: Alonso Suárez de Valtodano (1506-7, 1494-1506 respectively),
Juan Pardo y Tavera (1524-39 and 1539-46 respectively), Fernando de ValdÃ c©s y Salas (1539-47 and 1547-66
resp.), Diego Sarmiento de Valladares (1668-69 and 1669-95 resp.) and Antonio Ibáñez de la Riva Herrera
(1690-2 and 1709 resp.). These details are taken from Granda (2011). These cases represent between 20-25 %
of the approximately forty General Inquisitors.
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In fact, the trials against crypto-Islam, crypto-Judaism and crypto-Lutheranism together
represent less than 50% of the total activity of the Inquisition. Table 2 shows that the pro-
portion of crypto-moral trials8 was lower than the proportion of repression trials. This was
the case both at the national level and for all districts with the exception of Valencia, which
exhibited the highest concentration of moriscos in Spain.9 Thus, the data suggests that in-
quisitorial activity cannot be explained by purely religious motives. In Vidal-Robert (2013) I
show that inquisitorial activity had two main purposes: prevent revolts against the Spanish
Crown and to persecute ideas that differed from the ideas of the Crown. If persecution of
ideas, and not expropriation, were one of the main purposes of inquisitorial activity, we may
think that a lack of secure property rights will not be necessarily one channel through which
the Inquisition hindered Spanish economic development. However, the flow and adoption of
new ideas in the 19th century, for example, could have been affected by a previous repressive
activity. This lack of innovation could have harmed economic development.
Common knowledge on the Spanish Inquisition states that executions were the most fre-
quent sentence of an inquisitorial trial. As a consequence the Spanish institution it is seen
as one of the bloodiest European institutions of its time. However, the data shows that the
Spanish Inquisition was not different, in terms of the rate of executions, from other European
tribunals. Table 1 shows that the relative number of executions due to the Spanish Inquisition
did not differ from other European countries. The main difference comes from the absolute
number of trials and the persistence of its activity, which was much higher and lasted for a
considerably longer period in the Spanish case.
To observe the magnitude of the activity of the Spanish Inquisition and compare it with
other European institutions or persecution episodes, Figures 1 through 4 provide the number
of trials and the intensity (trials per thousands of people) of witchcraft trials and Inquisition
trials among European territories and Spanish inquisitorial districts. We observe that not only
was the total number of trials higher in the Spanish inquisitorial districts, but the intensity
and persistence of the Spanish Inquisition were greater compared to the European witchcrafts
trials. This suggests that the Inquisition was more active and more persistent over time than
8I label crypto-moral trials as those carried out against Islam, Lutheranism and Judaism.
9Moriscos were Muslims that converted to Catholicism.
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European witchcraft trials; thus, it is more likely that it caused a deeper and longer impact on
the society. The only comparable activity in terms of intensity and activity, is the Inquisition
of Venice and Geneva. Although this latter Inquisition surpassed the activity and intensity
of the Spanish Inquisition in particular years, the Spanish Inquisition lasted longer and was
more persistent than the Inquisition observed in these Italian regions. Given the absolute and
relative (with respect to other European institutions) magnitude of the activity of the Spanish
Inquisition and its persistence over time, it seems reasonable to think that this repressive
institution could have long-run effects on economic development.
3 Data
3.1 Inquisition Data
I collected data on trials of the Spanish Inquisition from several published books, articles and
catalogues written by historians who directly extracted their information from the National
Archives in Madrid (section Inquisition). In particular I use Vignau (1903) for the district of
Toledo, Pérez-Ramírez (1982) for Cuenca, Miguel (1987) and Miguel (1990) for Murcia and
Barcelona, repectively . Contreras (1982) and Cárcel (1980) and Cárcel (1976) contain the
lists of trials in Galicia and Valencia respectively. Ivars (1982) provides the list for trials in
the district of Granada. I use these published trial records to first assemble time series data
including the number of trials per year for five Spanish regions (Catalunya, Valencia, Murcia,
Castilla-la-Mancha and Madrid) and fourteen provinces (Girona, Barcelona, Lleida, Tarragona,
Castellón, Valencia, Alicante, Murcia, Guadalajara, Cuenca, Albacete, Ciudad Real, Toledo
and Madrid).
I also built a dataset containing the individual data of 35,000 trials from the following
five districts: Barcelona, Valencia, Murcia, Cuenca and Toledo. These published trial records
contain information on the names of the accused, the location where they lived, the year of
their trials, the charges against them and their final sentence. Location information allows me
to construct municipal level data of the activity of the Inquisition. This paper focuses on the
activity in Catalonia (trials from Barcelona district and some trials from Valencia district).
Appendix B, Appendix C and Appendix D show the evolution of the activity of the Inquisition
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in the 947 Catalan municipalities.
3.2 Population and Urbanization Data
3.2.1 Regions and Provinces
Spanish population data are obtained from several sources: the Census of 1591 (contained in
de Retana (1990)), Nadal (1984), and Cerrillo-Cruz (2000), Cárcel (1976), Salomon (1964).
Spanish urbanization10 data are obtained from Pérez (1995), Iglésies (1957), Vilar (1970),
Albert Carreras (2005), Cárcel (1976), Álvarez Nogal and de-la Escosura (2007), Pérez-Puchal
(1972), González (1829).
3.2.2 Municipalities
I use population data collected by Centre d’Estudis Demogràfics at Universitat Autònoma de
Barcelona for all Catalan municipalities (947) from 1497 to 1991 and Redondo Garcia (2002)
for 1378. Data is available for years 1378, 1497, 1515, 1553, 1717, 1787, 1857, 1860, 1877,
1887, 1897, 1900, 1910, 1920, 1930, 1936, 1940, 1945, 1950, 1955, 1960, 1965, 1970, 1975, 1981,
1986, 1991. Appendix D shows the evolution of population density in Catalonia.
To classify villages where trials took place, I use Bautista-Golobardas (1831) and Frigola
(1824). Villages could be classified as Realengas if they were under the jurisdiction of the
King (hereafter denominated King); Lord if they were under the jurisdiction of a Noble; or
Eclesiásticas or Abadengas if they belonged to the Church (hereafter Church). If villages could
not be classified with the above mentioned sources, I went through the city hall’s websites and
the Enciclopèdia Catalana.
3.3 Additional Data
I use alternative data to control for stories that potentially could explain both inquisitorial
activity and population growth. Appendix F shows the maps for Roman roads, accessibility
in Roman times, altitude and ruggedness.
10I define urbanization as the percentage of people, who live in villages with more than 5,000 inhabitants
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3.3.1 Historical access to commercial routes
De Soto (2010) provides GIS maps on Roman roads, maritime routes, and an index of village
accessibility in Roman times. I use the distance of each village to those routes as well as to
their intersections and Roman ports. Also, I use his index of accessibility.
3.3.2 Channels of persistence
I use questions on trust and technology advances provided in WVS and CIS surveys. WVS
data include information on the region where the respondent lives at the time of the survey,
while CIS surveys include information on the province of the respondent. I also use information
on economic and educational status as well as age from these surveys.11 I also use the number
of patents produced per region from 1850 until nowadays provided by Albert Carreras (2005).
To test the social polarization hypothesis, I use outcomes of elections in Spain during the 19th
century from Lozano (2010). In particular there is available data on the number of seats that
each party obtained in the Parliament. From this information I calculate polarization and
fractionalization indexes, as proposed by Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005). Finally, I am
able to use information on the existence of cultural centres in the province of Barcelona in late
19th century and beginning of the 20th century, Using a dataset on seven regions, fourteen
provinces and 947 municipalities on inquisitorial activity, population and economic outcomes,
I show that regions that were more affected by the Inquisition are associated with a lower
economic development than regions less affected by it. This association is more significant
in the beginning of the 19th century and in the beginning of the 20th century, Bosch-Datzira
(1991) . I test if the likelihood of having a cultural center is lower for a village that experienced
at least one trial of the Inquisition to observe if there is any correlation between Inquisition
and culture.
11The waves of the WVS are taken in 1981, 1990, 1995/1998, 1999/2000, 2005/2008. CIS surveys considered
are 2398, 2412, 2440, 2442, 2443, 2588, 2632, 2736 and 2752. The first one was taken in year 2000 and the last
one in year 2008.
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4 Effects of the Spanish Inquisition
4.1 Urbanization - Regional Level
I assemble time series data for seven regions (CCAA) of Spain regarding activities of the
Inquisition, population and urbanization outcomes.12 Figure 5 shows the level of inquisitorial
activity (absolute number of trials) at a regional level. The goal is to associate these different
inquisitorial activity levels with different economic patterns of development.13 Figure 6 shows
the urbanization path between 1530 and 2001 for 6 regions. I put together regions with a
urbanization rate greater than 20% in 1530 together (Murcia, Madrid, Comunidad Valenciana
and Andalucia) and regions with a urbanization rate smaller than 20% in 1530 (Catalunya and
Castilla la Mancha). Figure 6 shows the average urbanization rate for both groups between
1530 and 2001. We observe that there is a gap between these two groups that remains constant
until 1787 approximately. It is during the 19th century and early 20th century when we observe
that this gap closes almost completely. During the rest of the 20th century the gap remains
constant again. The urbanization gap closes precisely during the introduction of the Industrial
Revolution in Spain and one may wonder the reason why this happened and if it has some
relation with the Inquisition. The Spanish Inquisition persecuted ideas that differed from
the already accepted ideas and ideologies of the Kings. If new and original ideas were more
persecuted in specific regions, maybe those regions are less likely to accept and adopt new ideas
afterwards.14 Both groups (high and low urbanization) also differ in the absolute number of
inquisitorial trials per square kilometer. While the high urbanized group averages .33 trials
per square kilometer, the low urbanized group averages .17 trials per square kilometer. In this
section I focus on the association between trials of the Inquisition and urbanization growth.
15
12Spain is organized in 17 regions or Comunidades Autonomas (CCAA) and 50 provinces. Each province is
then subdivided in smaller units called comarca, similar to US county.
13With only 5 regions or CCAA this association has to be taken carefully.
14Phillips and Phillips (1997) describe that regions in the south of Spain adopted the industrial revolution
technology later than Catalunya, for example. It is the case that this coincides with different degrees of
inquisitorial activity. The South experienced higher volume of inquisitorial activity. However, is it enough to
explain different patterns of development? The Inquisition may explain part of this divergence, but obviously
it will not be the only explanation. For example, Drelichman (2005) suggests that American silver inflow and
an increasing rent seeking society also affected long run development.
15Next section focuses on possible channels of this association.
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Table 3 shows summary statistics of the CCAA (regions) under analysis as well as informa-
tion on geographical characteristics and the number of trials of the Inquisition. From the first
columns and the activity of the Inquisition, it seems reasonable to think that regions initially
more urbanized seem to experience a higher volume of inquisitorial activity as well as lower
urbanization growth. Therefore, I will control for initial urbanization and population levels in
my econometric approach.
The objective is to study if here is any association between inquisitorial activity and ur-
banization growth. The basic econometric specification proceed as follows:
urbi,t = β0 + β1 inquisitioni,t + β2 urbi,0 + β3 geographyi + f(time) (1)
where urbi,t indicates urbanization growth in region ibetween year t and t−1; inquisitioni
represents the accumulated number of trials of the inquisition in region i at time t; geographyi
includes geographic variables of region i such as latitude, longitude, area and altitude; f(time)
includes a linear time trend. I also control for initial urbanization rate and initial population,
defined as the level of urbanization and population for the first yer with available data (in this
case 1530).16
β1 is the coefficient of interest. I would expect that regions that were more affected by the
Inquisition would exhibit a lower urbanization rate or lower growth of urbanization.
Table 4 shows the estimates at a regional level. The results show the association of the
number of trials on urbanization growth. All regressions include latitude, longitude and square
kilometers for each region. The first column uses the whole sample of the regional database.
We observe a negative and not significant association between the number of trials and ur-
banization growth after controlling for initial urbanization level and current population. To
be more specific, a region with 1,000 trials more would be associated with 1% lower urban-
ization growth. 17 Column 2 runs the same regression just taking into account years before
the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939); column 3 shows the results for years after the Civil War.
I want to observe if the converging path in urbanization levels in the 19th and beginning of
16I have information on urbanization for all CCAA for the following years: 1530, 1591, 1694, 1787, 1857,
1900, 1930, 1960 and 2001.
17Again, the relationship is not significant.
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the 20th century that we observed in figure 6 is due in part to different levels of inquisitorial
activity. In other words, if regions that experienced a more severe activity of the inquisition
are related to lower urbanization growth. Columns 2 and 3 show that there is a significant
relationship at a 10% level for years before 1936. In particular, a region with 1,000 trials more
would be associated with 2% lower urbanization growth. For years after 1936 I do not find
any significant correlation. These results suggest that, if any, there is a negative association
between inquisitorial activity and urbanization growth before the Spanish Civil War.
The results of Table 4 suggest that inquisitorial activity (number of trials) is associated
with lower urbanization growth. However, this association appears to be significant until the
19th century and beginning of the 20th century.
4.2 Urbanization - Province Level
This section shows In this section I show the analysis on provincial data. I assemble time
series data for fourteen Spanish provinces on urbanization, inquisitorial activity and population
outcomes. Figures 7 and 8 show the severity of the Inquisition in these provinces. They show
both the degree of the absolute number of trials and the trials that were not against Judaism,
Lutheranism or Islam (I call them Repressive trials) for these fourteen provinces. 18 In the
analysis I take into account trials that are against religions other than Catholicism to find if
what matter is the persecution of ideas and not just the persecution of “rival” religions.
Table 5 shows summary statistics of the Spanish provinces under analysis as well as infor-
mation on geographical characteristics and the number of trials of the Inquisition. As with
the case of the Spanish regions, it seems that provinces initially more urbanized experience a
higher volume of inquisitorial activity as well as lower urbanization growth. Therefore, I will
control for initial urbanization and population levels in my econometric approach.
Table 6 shows the estimates at the province level. The first three columns use the whole
sample, columns 4 to 6 show the results when I restrict the sample to years after 1808 and
the last three columns only include years after 1936. The objective is to identify if there is a
specific period for which the activity of the inquisition is more associated with urbanization.19
18A darker red means that a region experienced more trials.
19The choice of these periods is done given the relevance of historical events. In 1808 the Inquisition was
abolished after Napoleon conquered Spain. In 1936 the Spanish Civil War started leading to a a more than 30
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For each subsample I use three measures of inquisitorial activity: absolute number of trials,
crypto-moral trials and repressive trials. For all samples we observe that crypto-moral trials
do not appear to have a significant association with urbanization. Moreover, the coefficient
changes its sign when we restrict the sample to years after 1936. Although the absolute number
of trials is negatively associated with urbanization, it is not significant. Only when I restrict
the sample to years after 1936 it is significant at a 10% level. However, if we only take into
account repressive trials we observe that they are negative and significantly correlated with
urbanization levels when I use the three samples. In particular, 1,000 trials are correlated
with 5-7% lower urbanization level. These results suggest that persecution of ideas hindered
economic development, but persecution of other religions do not seem to have any relation
with urbanization growth in the long-run. These results suggest a negative relation between
inquisitorial activity and urbanization. However, they do not provide the channel of causality.
Limited data availability prevents this to be explored at the regional or provincial level.
4.3 Population - Municipalities
4.3.1 Differences-in-Differences approach
In this section I compare changes in municipalities population growth before and after the
Inquisition tried a person. This approach allows me to eliminate the fixed differences that
exist between municipalities exposed to the Inquisition and municipalities that were not di-
rectly exposed to it by taking the difference before and after the Inquisition carried out a
trial. Moreover, I can eliminate any aggregate shock contemporaneous to the first trial of the
Inquisition by taking the difference of the change in population growth between municipalities
affected by the Inquisition and municipalities not directly affected by it.
However, municipalities did not suffered the first Inquisition trial at the same time. There-
fore, I cannot implement the classic differences-in-differences methodology since there is not
a unique year when all municipalities experienced the first trial of the Inquisition. For this
reason, I econometrically allow each municipality to have a different year for its first trial.20
In this specification I take as the control group municipalities where inquisition trials never
year dictatorship.
20I follow a similar empirical strategy discussed by Bertrand and Mullainathan (1999).
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occurred.
Table 7 presents summary statistics of the variables of interest for treatment and control
groups, excluding Barcelona. Treatment villages represent 48% of all municipalities. We can
observe that there are significant differences between treatment and control groups in initial
population and area of municipalities. When I include Barcelona in the sample, the magnitude
of the difference remains similar. The difference in area and initial population (i.e. population
in 1378) is both significant and large. This could create a certain long-run path dependence
for my results on population growth. I will use the vector of covariates that I described before
to avoid a bias in my results due to the influence of time-invariant characteristics across time.
That is, I control for initial population and its interaction with year dummies.
For municipalities where the Inquisition carried out at least one trial, I identify the period
after the Inquisition as the period after the occurrence of the first trial. For the control group,
I define after as the period after the first trial occurred in a neighbour village. I am able to
include year dummies in the specification to control for possible common aggregate shocks, as
well as county fixed effects. The basic specification, therefore, proceeds as follows:
populationgrowthi,t = αt + βc + inquisitioni + afterc,t + γi,t Xi,t + δ inquisitioni ∗ afterc,t + i,t
(2)
where populationgrowthi,t is the average annual population growth at municipality i be-
tween t and t−1. inquisitioni is the treatment variable (it takes the value of 1 if a municipality
experiened at least an inquisitorial trial); and Xi,t is a vector of time-invariant variables of
each municipality interacted with the set of year fixed effects. Adding the vector Xi,t to my
analysis will allow me to control for possible initial differences between municipalities that
may had an influence not only on inquisitorial trials, but also on population growth. Variable
afteri,t is a dummy variable for the period after the first trial of the Inquisition takes place
invillage i or in a neighbour village (for the control group). I also control for year and county
fixed effects.
Table 8 shows the results of the analysis considering the whole sample (i.e. all years) in
15
the first two columns and a restricted sample for the rest of the table. Odd columns show the
results for the whole sample while even columns show the results when Barcelona is not in
the sample. We observe a negative association of the Inquisition on population growth after a
municipality has experienced an inquisitorial trial. However, this effect is significant until the
first half of the 19th century. In particular, I find that the Inquisition lead to a 0.11% lower
annual population growth. However, as we observe this effect is not significant when I use all
years available from 1378 to 2001 or when I restrict the sample to years up to 1930. These
results do not change when Barcelona is excluded from the sample. For this reason all the
remaining tables include Barcelona in their sample, unless it is explicitly said otherwise.
There are alternative stories that could explain both the presence of the Inquisition in a
village and its growth. For instance, it could be argued that historical access to commercial
routes could have affected both. On the one hand, being close to a historical route could imply
an easy access for the Inquisition, or that the Inquisition could have more interest in being
present. On the other hand, being close to a commercial route could have implications for
growth. Table 9 controls for historical access to commercial routes. In the first two columns I
control for distances to Roman roads, Roman maritime routes and navigable rivers in Roman
times. However, one could argue that what is more important is not the distance to commercial
routes, but the distance to commercial centres. For this reason, in columns three and four I
control for distances to Roman roads intersections and ports. Finally, in the last two columns,
I control for an index of accessibility, which takes into account access to these routes and ports.
The results show the same pattern as in Table 8. That is, the Inquisition lead to a 0.12% lower
annual population growth, but the effect vanishes after the first half of the 19th century.
Another concern that may arise is that I am capturing a “migration” effect rather than
an effect of the Inquisition on economic growth. In Table 10 I include the number of trials
that occurred in the neighbor villages of the municipality under analysis. Results show a
positive impact of the trials occurred in other villages when I include the whole sample. This
result suggests that there existed a “migration” effect. However, the results of our coefficient of
interest do not change. Therefore, it is not the case that the Inquisition just affected population
growth through a migration effect.
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Also, it could be argued that the Inquisition would like to control those areas that are
close to France, because of the influence of lutheranism and this could have an impact on the
results. In a different way, distance to rivers that were used as localization for electric and
textile industries in the 19th century, could have an impact on population growth that would
not be due to the Inquisition. Table 10 controls for both explanations distance to France
(columns 3 and 4) and distance to rivers (columns 5 and 6). Results show the same pattern
as before and they appear to be more significant.
As stated in the introduction, the Spanish Inquisition was created to persecute crypto-
morality, cryptojudaism and cryptoislamism. However, from the mid 16th century it was used
to persecute political ideologies as well. For this reason, I want to disentangle if the effect
found in the previous tables is due to trials against other religions (or cryptomorality trials)
or to trials against Catholic people. Table 11 show the same specification as in Table 10 using
all trials (columns 1 and 2), trials against catholics (columns 3 and 4) and trials against other
religions (last two columns). The results show that the efffect of the Inquisition is driven by
trials agains Catholics. Trials against other religions do not seem to matter.
Given the religious origin of the institution, it could be argued that preexistent religiosity of
a village could be related to the presence of the Inquisition and could have affected population
growth. One possible way to test this alternative story id to control for the ecclesiastical
jurisdiction of a village. In Spain, villages could be under the jurisdiction of the King, under
the jurisdiction of the Church, under the jurisdiction of a noble or under the jurisdiction of
a military order. If the alternative story is right, the effect found of inquisitorial activity on
growth would be caused by the presence of the Church. Therefore, we should not observe any
significant effect of the inquisition when I control for ecclesiastical jurisdiction. Table 13 shows
the results when I include a Church variable interacted with year dummies. The results are
robust, the Inquisition decreased annual population growth by 0.13%.
Another concern that may arise is that I have treated the first trial of the Inquisition as
an exogenous episode. In other words, the first trial of the Inquisition can be the result of
economic conditions that can be correlated with population growth and, therefore, can bias
my previous results. In particular, I am concerned that the first trial of the Inquisition is
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the result of previous conditions in the municipality under analysis. Following Bertrand and
Mullainathan (1999) I address this concern by using municipality leads to see if the effects of
the Inquisition were already happening before the trials of the Inquisition took place.
Table 14 shows the results for this analysis. Columns 1 and 2 show the results when
I include leads to the analysis with the whole sample. Columns 3 and 4 show the results
for trial against Catholics and the last two columns show the results for trials against other
religions or cryptomorality trials. In the three cases, there is no evidence that supports the
existence of a previous trend that lead to the first trial of the Inquisition. In other words,
treatment and control municipalities did not differ significantly in the trend previous to the
presence of the Inquisition.
It is also interesting to observe the timing of the effect of the Inquisition. In particular I
define variables that correspond to the period after the first trial of the Inquisition took place,
to two periods after the first trial occurred and to three or more periods afterwards. Table 15
shows the results of the dynamics of the effect of the Spanish Inquisition. The results show
that the period after the first trial occurs is the most relevant. However, if I restrict the sample
to the years before 1860, all periods are relevant and their magnitude is increasing over time.
That would show the most significant impact of the Inquisition occurred in the first half of
the 19th century.
5 Channels of Persistence: Trust, Social Polarization and Adop-
tion of New Technologies
5.1 Trust
Trials of the Spanish Inquisition started after an anonymous accusation, whose author was
never made public. Although, the Inquisition persecuted false witnesses as well, anonymous
accusations could have harmed trust levels. On the one hand, it could have created an inse-
curity level making people from the same village less cooperative. On the other hand, future
institutions would be weaker and therefore less trustworthy.
To test if a decrease on trust levels persisted over time, I obtained answers from the World
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Values Survey questions addressing trust on institutions and trust on people.21 Table 18 shows
the results of regressing the answers to these questions on the inquisitorial level of the region
of the respondent. I control for the education and the economic levels of the respondent.
The first two rows show that respondents, who live in a region that was more affected by the
Inquisition are associated with higher levels of trust on the government and the parliament.
However, no significant correlations were found regarding levels on trust between people.
Table 19 shows the results of the same questions using CIS surveys. In this case, the
surveys provide information on the province of th respondent not just the region. The results
on trust on institutions are not robust. Trust between friends or on people you first meet does
not seem related to the trials of the province of the respondent. Column x shows the results on
the level of mistrust on the Church. There is no evidence suggesting that trust on the Church
is related to the severity of the Inquisition.
5.2 Social Polarization
Historians have often defined the persistence of the inquisitorial mind as the influence of in-
quisitorial ideas and mentality to current society’s behavior, Ángel Alcalá (1984). In particular,
they have argued that persecution of ideas that did not correspond to the status quo could
have some effects on the levels of polarization in society. They define social polarization as the
existence of two main groups who would have opposite behaviors and that they would never
reach an agreement.
To show if the Inquisition had any relation with a possible social polarization as it is argued
by historians, I calculate polarization measures obtained from electoral outcomes in the 19th
century. Table 20 shows the correlation between polarization and inquisitorial trials at the
province level. We can see that there is no significant correlation between any type of trials
and the level of polarization. Therefore, there is no evidence suggesting that the Inquisition
is correlated with social polarization.
21Mistrust levels go from 1 to 5, where 5 indicates the highest level of mistrust.
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5.3 Culture and adoption of new technology
As shown in Table 2, more than half of the trials of the Spanish Inquisition were not carried
out against other religions. This suggests that the objective of the Inquisition was also to
persecute ideas or political ideologies that could jeopardize the structures of the kingdom
as shown by Haliczer (1990) and Vidal-Robert (2013). This repressive behavior could have
negatively affected the willingness to innovate or to invest in new technology and culture. The
fear of being punished by the Inquisition would decrease innovation and culture.
I test this hypothesis by using WVS and CIS Surveys on attitudes towards new technology.
The last two rows of Table 18 show that respondents, who live in regions more affected by the
Inquisition, are more reluctant to adopt or to have a positive attitude towards new scientific
advances. Similarly, first column in Table 19 show that respondents, who live in provinces
where the inquisition was more severe, answer that new technologies would harm development
in some degree. In particular, a person who lives in a region or province with 1,000 trials is
1.5% less likely to think that scientific advances are positive for progress.
I also regress a similar specification as equation 3, which includes the number of patents in
each region in a a given year as the dependent variable. We observe a negative and significant
association between inquisitorial activity and the number of patents produced by a region.
One more inquisitorial trial per year is associated with six patents less produced in a region.
Finally, I also test if the Inquisition could be related to the spread of culture. For this
purpose, I collected data on cultural centres that existed in municipalities in the province of
Barcelona in the second half of the 19th century and beginning of the 20th century. Table
21 shows correlations between the number of trials of the Inquisition and the likelihood that
exists a cultural center in a municipality of the province of Barcelona. One more trial of the
Inquisition is associated with a 1.7% lower likelihood of the existence of a cultural centre. If
we focus on crypto-moral trials, I show that one trial is associated with a 3.7% lower likelihood
of the existence of a cultural centre. This association is not significant, but still negative, for
repressive trials.
These results suggest that the Spanish Inquisition is associated with a long and negative
influence on innovation and culture.
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6 Conclusions
This paper relates to the literature on the long-run impact of historical institutions on economic
outcomes. In particular, I explore the role of the Spanish Inquisition on Spanish economic
development. Given data availability, I can provide results not only of the impact of the
Inquisition on current outcomes but also on economic trajectories since its disappearance. This
is a relevant issue to understand the persistence of the effect of historical institutions as well as
the mechanisms through which these institutions may have interacted with cultural factors and
hindered economic development paths. For instance, Frankema and van Waijenburg (2012) use
pre-1950 data on urban unskilled real wages in nine British African colonies to show that they
were well above subsistence level, disregarding then theories that stress persistent African
structural growth impediments, such as extractive colonial institutions or slave exports.22
Therefore we should look deeper to understand either other factors that contributed to African
backwardness or why those institutions have an impact on current outcomes and not during
all development paths.
This paper shows that the Inquisition had an impact on population growth, as a proxy
for economic development, until the first half of the 19th century. In particular, I show that
villages that suffered at least one trial of the Inquisition grew at 0.11% lower rate than those
that did not suffered any trial. The significance of this effect smoothly vanishes after 1860.
I also explore three possible channels or mechanisms through which the Inquisition may
have had an impact either on economic outcomes or on the society’s behavior. The results
do not show significant associations between inquisitorial activity and trust levels or social
polarization. On the contrary, it shows significant negative associations between trials of the
Inquisition and attitudes towards new technologies or the spread of culture. In particular, I
show that people that live in areas in which the activity of the Inquisition was more severe are
more likely to think that new technologies will harm them (4% more likely with a difference
of 1,000 trials). I also show that municipalities that experienced trials of the Inquisition were
less likely to have a cultural center between 1860 and 1930. These results suggest that the
effect of the Inquisition on economic performance would have been through entrepreneurship
22See Acemoglu et al. (2001) or Nunn (2008).
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incentives and lack of new technology adoption given the motivations of its activity.
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Figures
Figure 1: Witchcraft and Inquisition Trials in Europe
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Graphs for Estonia, Finland, Hungary and Norway show the number of
witchcraft trials in those countries between 1500 and 1800. Geneva and Venice
graphs show inquisitorial trials in those areas between 1500 and 1800.
Figure 2: Inquisition Trials in Spain
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The graphs show the number of trials of the Inquisition in the Spanish districts
of Barcelona, Cordoba, Cuenca, Granada, Murcia and Valencia between 1478
and 1808.
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Figure 3: Witchcraft and Inquisition Intensity in Europe
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Graphs for Estonia, Finland, Hungary and Norway show the number of
witchcraft trials per 1,000 inhabitants in those countries between 1500 and
1800. Geneva and Venice graphs show inquisitorial trials per 1,000 inhabi-
tants in those areas between 1500 and 1800.
Figure 4: Inquisition Intensity in Spain
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The graphs show the number of trials of the Inquisition per 1,000 inhabitants
in the Spanish districts of Barcelona, Cordoba, Cuenca, Granada, Murcia and
Valencia between 1478 and 1808.
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Figure 5: Regional Inquisitorial Activity
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The map shows levels of Inquisition trials in the regions of Catalunya, Madrid,
Castilla la Mancha, Murcia and Valencia. Darker red is linked to more trials of
the Inquisition. The classification considers Inquisition trials in those regions
between 1478 and 1808.
Figure 6: Urbanization
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The graph shows the average urbanization rate between 1530 and 2001 of
regions with an initial urbanization rate of at least 20% (solid line) and the
average urbanization rate of those regions with less than 20% initial urban-
ization rate (dashed line). Regions with high initial urbanization rate are
Murcia, Madrid, Comunidad Valenciana and Andalucia. Regions with low
initial urbanization rate are Catalunya and Castilla la Mancha.
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Figure 7: Province Inquisitorial Activity
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The map depicts the level of Inquisition trials in the provinces with available
data for the period 1478-1808. Darker red provinces are associated with more
Inquisition trials. All Inquisition trials are considered.
Figure 8: Province Inquisitorial Activity
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The map depicts the level of Inquisition trials in the provinces with available
data for the period 1478-1808. Darker red provinces are associated with more
Inquisition trials. Repressive trials (all trials excluding crypto-moral trials)
are considered.
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Tables
Table 1: European Tribunals Activity
Tribunal Period Trials Trials/year Executions
Spanish Monarchy 1540-1700 49,092 305 3%
Venetian Inquisition 1541-1592 1,560 30 1%
Toulouse Parliament 1500-1560 1,074 18 6%
Bordeaux Parliament 1541-1559 477 25 4%
Chambre Ardente (Paris) 1547-1550 557 139 7%
Coimbra Inquisition 1567-1631 3,837 59 7%
Source: Parker (1982).
Table 2: Typology of trials
Heresy / District Barcelona Cordoba Cuenca Galicia Granada Murcia Valencia Spain
Crypto-moral Trials 0.390 0.448 0.329 0.339 0.503 0.405 0.699 0.467
Judaism 0.207 0.359 0.260 0.206 0.279 0.201 0.346 0.271
Islam 0.039 0.080 0.059 0.036 0.224 0.204 0.323 0.161
Lutheranism 0.144 0.009 0.010 0.097 0.000 0.000 0.030 0.035
Social control trials 0.610 0.552 0.671 0.661 0.497 0.595 0.301 0.533
Bigamy 0.059 0.022 0.060 0.009
Blasphemy 0.042 0.096 0.066 0.026
Superstition 0.096 0.025 0.050 0.063 0.064 0.052 0.043 0.057
The table shows the proportion of different type of trials for the districts with available data between 1478
and 1808. The last column, called Spain, shows the proportion when all the districts with available data
are considered. Crypto-moral trials are those trials against Judaism, Lutheranism and Islam. Social control
trials are those against “minor heresies” such as bigamy, blasphemy, superstition, fornication, acts against
the Inquisition,.. that do not include religions other than Catholicism.
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Table 4: Urbanization Growth and Inquisition: Regional Level
Dependent variable: Urbanization growth (in %)
Whole sample Until 1936 From 1936
Trials -0.001 -0.002* 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Observations 56 42 14
Geography Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Population Yes Yes Yes
Initial Urbanization Yes Yes Yes
The dependent variable is urbanization rate (in %). Trials are
the accumulated inquisitorial trials up to the year under analysis.
Geography include latitude, longitude and area variables. Initial
urbanization is urbanization rate in 1530. Years: 1530, 1591, 1698,
1787, 1860, 1900, 1950, 2000. Standard errors in parentheses.
35
T
ab
le
5:
Su
m
m
ar
y
st
at
is
ti
cs
:
P
ro
vi
nc
es
P
ro
vi
nc
e
U
rb
an
iz
at
io
n
P
op
ul
at
io
n
T
ri
al
s
R
ep
re
ss
iv
e
tr
ia
ls
P
op
ul
at
io
n
15
91
U
rb
an
iz
at
io
n
15
91
In
te
ns
it
y
A
re
a
C
oa
st
A
lt
it
ud
e
La
ti
tu
de
G
ir
on
a
22
.7
71
33
73
20
.9
53
1
40
9
80
70
8
7
6.
57
9
59
09
26
0
51
4
42
.0
7
(1
2.
48
0)
(1
11
34
3.
4)
Ll
ei
da
15
.3
76
29
30
58
.8
44
2
35
8
75
20
9
7
5.
87
7
12
17
2
0
93
4
42
.0
7
(1
3.
01
1)
(7
32
69
.2
3)
B
ar
ce
lo
na
64
.1
94
20
15
87
0
23
07
12
27
84
06
0
34
27
.4
45
77
28
16
1
51
6
41
.7
6
(1
9.
37
5)
(1
58
08
22
)
T
ar
ra
go
na
28
.0
47
35
99
31
.8
65
2
37
9
60
26
0
7
10
.8
20
63
02
27
8
33
9
41
.0
5
(1
1.
16
0)
(1
23
94
6.
2)
C
as
te
llo
n
37
.0
18
31
42
19
.8
52
8
12
6
66
67
2
8
7.
91
9
66
36
13
9
59
3
40
.2
5
(1
6.
44
4)
(9
85
21
.3
7)
V
al
en
ci
a
50
.1
82
11
28
63
7
36
03
11
75
14
19
62
36
25
.3
80
10
80
7
13
5
49
1
39
.4
5
(1
5.
94
8)
(6
15
22
5.
6)
A
lic
an
te
44
.8
12
63
62
49
.1
11
51
50
4
67
32
5
27
17
.0
96
58
17
24
4
39
8
38
.3
7
(1
6.
39
0)
(3
71
20
6.
5)
M
ur
ci
a
43
.3
47
64
82
99
.7
18
69
96
5
14
23
50
21
13
.1
30
11
31
3
27
4
50
1
38
.0
7
(1
2.
74
7)
(2
72
47
8.
9)
C
ue
nc
a
12
.1
26
08
33
.8
47
98
36
74
30
65
13
6
15
.6
53
17
14
0
0
96
0
39
.9
5
(1
1.
59
6)
(4
54
89
.0
5)
T
ol
ed
o
26
.8
18
42
54
37
.2
18
74
13
92
36
63
18
24
5.
11
6
15
36
9
0
57
7
39
.7
9
(9
.5
35
)
(8
28
30
.1
8)
G
ua
da
la
ja
ra
11
.3
23
18
77
04
.7
17
40
10
43
19
69
25
10
8.
83
6
12
21
4
0
10
69
40
.7
4
(1
3.
84
3)
(2
29
65
.7
6)
C
iu
da
d
R
ea
l
56
.2
06
38
76
44
.6
10
21
71
8
97
07
5
50
10
.5
18
19
81
3
0
71
2
38
.9
7
(1
1.
62
8)
(1
44
01
5.
7)
A
lb
ac
et
e
32
.1
88
28
01
73
.4
87
4
61
3
91
12
5
13
9.
59
1
14
92
6
0
84
5
38
.7
2
(1
4.
25
5)
(8
80
70
.7
1)
M
ad
ri
d
71
.9
88
18
87
10
4
29
90
14
52
26
97
26
41
11
.0
85
80
27
0
81
7
40
.5
2
(1
4.
58
9)
(1
74
10
01
)
T
ot
al
36
.8
83
65
44
63
.2
17
41
.4
29
10
02
.5
14
61
59
.1
20
.7
86
12
.5
03
11
01
2.
36
10
6.
5
66
1.
85
7
40
.1
27
(2
2.
96
3)
(8
68
05
3.
9)
(1
26
0.
58
9)
(8
46
.0
73
)
(9
67
82
.5
7)
(1
4.
28
9)
(6
.5
92
)
(4
37
0.
48
9)
(1
14
.9
37
)
(2
19
.6
88
)
(1
.2
80
)
R
ep
re
ss
iv
e
tr
ia
ls
ar
e
tr
ia
ls
no
t
ag
ai
ns
t
Ju
da
is
m
,
Lu
th
er
an
is
m
or
Is
la
m
.
In
te
ns
it
y
is
de
fin
ed
as
th
e
to
ta
l
nu
m
be
r
of
tr
ia
ls
in
on
e
re
gi
on
di
vi
de
d
by
po
pu
la
ti
on
in
15
91
in
th
at
re
gi
on
.
U
rb
an
iz
at
io
n
an
d
ur
ba
ni
za
ti
on
in
15
91
ar
e
in
%
.
A
re
a
is
in
sq
ua
re
d
ki
lo
m
et
er
s
an
d
co
as
t
is
in
ki
lo
m
et
er
s.
A
lt
it
ud
e
is
in
m
et
er
s.
St
an
da
rd
de
vi
at
io
ns
in
pa
re
nt
he
se
s.
36
T
ab
le
6:
U
rb
an
iz
at
io
n
an
d
In
qu
is
it
io
n:
P
ro
vi
nc
e
Le
ve
l
D
ep
en
de
nt
va
ri
ab
le
:
U
rb
an
iz
at
io
n
(i
n
%
)
W
ho
le
Sa
m
pl
e
A
ft
er
18
08
A
ft
er
19
36
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
(9
)
In
qu
is
it
io
n
T
ri
al
s
-0
.0
01
-0
.0
01
-0
.0
03
*
(0
.0
01
)
(0
.0
01
)
(0
.0
02
)
C
ry
pt
o-
m
or
al
T
ri
al
s
0.
00
4
0.
00
3
-0
.0
01
(0
.0
03
)
(0
.0
03
)
(0
.0
04
)
R
ep
re
ss
iv
e
T
ri
al
s
-0
.0
05
**
-0
.0
05
**
-0
.0
07
**
*
(0
.0
02
)
(0
.0
02
)
(0
.0
03
)
O
bs
er
va
ti
on
s
11
2
11
2
11
2
84
84
84
42
42
42
R
-s
qu
ar
ed
0.
67
3
0.
67
9
0.
69
0
0.
68
3
0.
68
4
0.
70
1
0.
73
1
0.
70
3
0.
75
7
G
eo
gr
ap
hy
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
ea
r
F
E
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
P
op
ul
at
io
n
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
U
rb
an
iz
at
io
n
ra
te
(i
n
%
)
is
th
e
de
pe
nd
en
t
va
ri
ab
le
.
T
ri
al
s
ar
e
al
lt
ri
al
s
of
th
e
In
qu
is
it
io
n.
C
ry
pt
o-
m
or
al
tr
ia
ls
ar
e
tr
ia
ls
ag
ai
ns
t
Is
la
m
,
Ju
da
is
m
or
Lu
th
er
an
is
m
.
R
ep
re
ss
iv
e
tr
ia
ls
ar
e
th
os
e
tr
ia
ls
th
at
ar
e
no
t
ag
ai
ns
t
ot
he
r
re
lig
io
ns
.
G
eo
gr
ap
hy
va
ri
ab
le
s
in
cl
ud
e
la
ti
tu
de
,
lo
ng
it
ud
e,
C
oa
st
,
an
d
A
re
a.
Y
ea
rs
:
15
91
,
17
87
,
18
77
,
19
00
,
19
30
,1
96
0,
19
91
,2
00
1.
St
an
da
rd
er
ro
rs
in
pa
re
nt
he
se
s.
37
Table 7: Summary Statistics: Municipal Level (Catalunya)
No Inquisition Inquisition (1)-(2) t
Trials 4.869
(12.530)
Annual Growth (1378-1991) 0.276 0.330 -0.055*** -15.149
(0.236) (0.255) (0.004)
Area 29.781 38.651 -8.870*** -3.923
(28.988) (39.859) (2.261)
Population in 1378 112.957 287.548 -174.591*** -7.121
(127.133) (525.759) (24.517)
Density in 1378 5.467 12.438 -6.970** -3.062
(6.732) (49.859) (2.277)
Church 0.288 0.257 0.031 1.070
(0.453) (0.438) (0.029)
Dist. to main rivers (m) 4926.800 6101.439 -1174.639* -2.092
(8493.699) (8711.101) (561.375)
Dist. to rivers (m) 3484.269 4182.680 -698.412 -1.471
(7427.669) (7095.728) (474.651)
Dist. to Navigable rivers (m) 19121.890 18741.753 380.137 0.272
(21686.742) (21158.270) (1399.399)
Dist. Maritime routes (m) 43541.974 39791.349 3750.625 1.606
(34275.450) (37306.301) (2334.735)
Dist. to Ports (m) 38820.772 35491.493 3329.279 1.477
(33371.297) (35721.643) (2253.603)
Dist. to Roads (m) 1818.279 1720.806 97.473 0.496
(2895.344) (3127.983) (196.459)
Dist. to intersection (m) 9561.370 8478.700 1082.670* 2.132
(7867.942) (7677.390) (507.738)
Number of intersections 0.043 0.122 -0.079*** -3.378
(0.213) (0.467) (0.023)
Dist. to France (m) 78543.620 71443.283 7100.338* 2.215
(52527.781) (45072.459) (3205.070)
Dist. to Sea (m) 40683.872 37357.637 3326.236 1.408
(34720.065) (37689.334) (2361.726)
Dist. to Regions (m) 87709.808 99903.216 -12193.408** -3.248
(57774.467) (57216.959) (3754.456)
Accessibility 0.425 0.426 -0.000 -0.042
(0.128) (0.127) (0.008)
Latitude 41.718 41.755 -0.037 -1.342
(0.440) (0.401) (0.028)
Longitude 1.669 1.844 -0.175*** -3.414
(0.804) (0.764) (0.051)
Ruggedness 36.824 35.497 1.327 0.828
(25.147) (23.870) (1.602)
Altitude (m) 479.138 433.999 45.139 1.656
(431.709) (401.534) (27.257)
Observations 490 451
The sample does not include Barcelona. To see summary statistics when Barcelona is in-
cluded see Appendix A.No Inquisition is the sample of municipalities that did not experience
a trial of the Inquisition. Inquisition is the sample of municipalities that experienced at least
one trial of the Inquisition. Annual growth is annual population growth during the pe-
riod 1378-1991. Density in 1378 is the population in 1378 divided by area. Church is the
proportion of municipalities of each group that were under the jurisdiction of the Church.
Distances are in meters. Distance to intersection is the minimum distance of a municipality
to the closest intersection of Roman roads. Distance to Regions is the minimum distance
between a municipality and the border of Catalunya with Aragon or Valencia. Accessibility
is an index of how accessible was a municipality in Roman times. See De Soto (2010).
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Table 8: Population and Inquisition: Municipal Level (Catalonia)
Dependent variable: Annual Population Growth (in %)
All years Before 1860 Before 1930
Whole sample Without Barcelona Whole sample Without Barcelona Whole sample Without Barcelona
Inquisition x After 0.078 0.065 -0.117* -0.112* -0.078 -0.079
(0.086) (0.086) (0.064) (0.064) (0.072) (0.072)
Inquisition 0.036 0.034 0.065 0.073 0.073 0.079
(0.074) (0.074) (0.059) (0.059) (0.062) (0.062)
After 0.124 0.129 0.032 0.041 0.019 0.027
(0.089) (0.090) (0.075) (0.075) (0.078) (0.079)
Observations 22,343 22,318 4,732 4,726 10,238 10,226
R-squared 0.180 0.181 0.129 0.130 0.115 0.115
Capital Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Population 1378 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geography Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Dependent variable is annual population growth (in %). Whole sample is considered in the first two columns, a sub-sample
for years before 1860 is used for columns 3 and 4 and a sub-sample for years before 1930 is used for the last two columns.
Inquisition is a dummy for municipalities that experienced at least one trial of the Inquisition, as defined in Section 4.3.
After is a dummy with value 1 after the first trial of the Inquisition occurs in a municipality or a neighbour municipality, as
defined in Section 4.3. Standard errors clustered at the town level. Geography variables include Altitude and ruggedness.
Population 1378 is a variable that includes population in year 1378. Years: 1497, 1515, 1553, 1717, 1787, 1857, 1860, 1877,
1887, 1900, 1910, 1920, 1930, 1936, 1940, 1945, 1950, 1955, 1960, 1965, 1970, 1975, 1981, 1986, 1991.
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Table 9: Historical access to commercial routes: Municipal Level (Catalonia)
Dependent variable: Annual Population Growth (in %)
Dist. Routes Dist eco centers Accessibility
All years Before 1860 All years Before 1860 All years Before 1860
Inquisition x After 0.032 -0.123* 0.044 -0.120* 0.087 -0.116*
(0.085) (0.064) (0.084) (0.064) (0.084) (0.064)
Inquisition 0.080 0.068 0.069 0.070 0.027 0.064
(0.073) (0.059) (0.072) (0.059) (0.072) (0.059)
After 0.162* 0.047 0.134 0.026 0.168* 0.038
(0.088) (0.075) (0.091) (0.077) (0.088) (0.075)
Observations 22,343 4,732 22,343 4,732 22,343 4,732
R-squared 0.205 0.148 0.200 0.140 0.188 0.131
Capital Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Population 1378 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geography Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Dependent variable is annual population growth (in %). Columns with title All years include the whole
sample. Columns with title Before 1860 include a sub-sample for years before 1860. Columns under
Dist. to routes include distance to the closest Roman route to the municipality. Columns under Dist.
eco centers include distance to the closest intersection of Roman routes to a municipality. Columns
under Accessibility include the Accessibility variable as defined in Section 4.3. Inquisition is a dummy
for municipalities that experienced at least one trial of the Inquisition, as defined in Section 4.3. After
is a dummy with value 1 after the first trial of the Inquisition occurs in a municipality or a neighbour
municipality, as defined in Section 4.3. Standard errors clustered at the town level. Geography variables
include Altitude and ruggedness. Population 1378 is a variable that includes population in year 1378.
Years: 1497, 1515, 1553, 1717, 1787, 1857, 1860, 1877, 1887, 1900, 1910, 1920, 1930, 1936, 1940, 1945,
1950, 1955, 1960, 1965, 1970, 1975, 1981, 1986, 1991.
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Table 10: Migration, Distance to France and Rivers: Municipal Level (Catalonia)
Dependent variable: Annual Population Growth (in %)
Neigh. trials Dist. borders Dist. rivers
All years Before 1860 All years Before 1860 All years Before 1860
Inquisition x After 0.081 -0.117* 0.038 -0.126** 0.055 -0.131**
(0.083) (0.064) (0.082) (0.063) (0.081) (0.063)
Inquisition 0.026 0.064 0.075 0.067 0.058 0.071
(0.071) (0.059) (0.070) (0.058) (0.069) (0.058)
After 0.154* 0.037 0.043 0.003 0.033 0.011
(0.090) (0.075) (0.087) (0.075) (0.083) (0.074)
Trials (neighbours) 0.0005*** 0.0000 0.0005*** 0.0000 0.0004*** 0.0000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 22,343 4,732 22,343 4,732 22,343 4,732
R-squared 0.189 0.131 0.210 0.157 0.218 0.161
Capital Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Population 1378 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geography Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Historic access Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Border distances Yes Yes Yes Yes
Dependent variable is annual population growth (in %). Columns with title All years include the whole
sample. Columns with title Before 1860 include a sub-sample for years before 1860. Columns under
Dist. to borders include distance to France, the Mediterranean sea, and regional borders. Columns
with title Dist. to rivers include distance to main rivers,Inquisition is a dummy for municipalities that
experienced at least one trial of the Inquisition, as defined in Section 4.3. After is a dummy with value
1 after the first trial of the Inquisition occurs in a municipality or a neighbour municipality, as defined
in Section 4.3. Standard errors clustered at the town level. Geography variables include Altitude and
ruggedness. Population 1378 is a variable that includes population in year 1378. Historic access include
the accessibility variable. Border distances include Dist. to borders. Trials (neighbours) are the trials in
neighbour municipalities. Years: 1497, 1515, 1553, 1717, 1787, 1857, 1860, 1877, 1887, 1900, 1910, 1920,
1930, 1936, 1940, 1945, 1950, 1955, 1960, 1965, 1970, 1975, 1981, 1986, 1991.
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Table 11: Type of trials: Municipal Level (Catalonia)
Dependent variable: Annual Population Growth (in %)
All trials Repressive trials Crypto-moral trials
All years Before 1860 All years Before 1860 All years Before 1860
Inquisition x After 0.055 -0.131** 0.074 -0.135** 0.313*** -0.029
(0.081) (0.063) (0.079) (0.061) (0.110) (0.067)
Inquisition 0.058 0.071 0.034 0.068 -0.064 -0.010
(0.069) (0.058) (0.066) (0.055) (0.092) (0.059)
After 0.033 0.011 -0.184** -0.131** -0.080 -0.002
(0.083) (0.074) (0.077) (0.067) (0.050) (0.036)
Observations 22,343 4,732 22,343 4,732 22,343 4,732
R-squared 0.218 0.161 0.218 0.162 0.218 0.161
Capital Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Population 1378 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geography Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Historic access Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Border distances Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Trials Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Dependent variable is annual population growth (in %). Columns with title All years include the whole
sample. Columns with title Before 1860 include a sub-sample for years before 1860. First two columns
replicate the results of the last two columns of Table 10 when all trials are considered. Columns under
Crypto-moral trials only include trials against Judaism, Lutheranism or Islam. Columns under Repressive
trials include all trials excluding crypto-moral trials. After is a dummy with value 1 after the first trial of
the Inquisition occurs in a municipality or a neighbour municipality, as defined in Section 4.3. Standard
errors clustered at the town level. Geography variables include Altitude and ruggedness. Population
1378 is a variable that includes population in year 1378. Historic access include the accessibility variable.
Border distances include Dist. to borders. Trials (neighbours) are the trials in neighbour municipalities.
Years: 1497, 1515, 1553, 1717, 1787, 1857, 1860, 1877, 1887, 1900, 1910, 1920, 1930, 1936, 1940, 1945,
1950, 1955, 1960, 1965, 1970, 1975, 1981, 1986, 1991.
42
Table 12: Number of trials: Municipal Level (Catalonia)
Dependent variable: Annual Population Growth (in %)
All trials Repressive trials Crypto-moral trials
All years Before 1860 All years Before 1860 All years Before 1860
Inquisition x After 0.044 -0.126** 0.055 -0.130** 0.297*** -0.016
(0.082) (0.063) (0.081) (0.062) (0.112) (0.068)
Inq x After x Trials -0.0015 -0.0004 0.0022 -0.0032 -0.0057** 0.0002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
Inquisition 0.056 0.079 0.033 0.080 -0.078 0.013
(0.069) (0.058) (0.066) (0.055) (0.094) (0.059)
After 0.039 0.020 -0.177** -0.127* -0.072 0.001
(0.084) (0.074) (0.077) (0.067) (0.050) (0.036)
Observations 22,318 4,726 22,318 4,726 22,318 4,726
R-squared 0.219 0.162 0.219 0.163 0.219 0.161
Capital Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Population 1378 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geography Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Historic access Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Border distances Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Trials Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Dependent variable is annual population growth (in %). Columns with title All years include
the whole sample. Columns with title Before 1860 include a sub-sample for years before 1860.
First two columns replicate the results of the last two columns of Table 10 when all trials are
considered. Columns under Crypto-moral trials only include trials against Judaism, Lutheranism
or Islam. Columns under Repressive trials include all trials excluding crypto-moral trials. After is
a dummy with value 1 after the first trial of the Inquisition occurs in a municipality or a neighbour
municipality, as defined in Section 4.3. Standard errors clustered at the town level. Geography
variables include Altitude and ruggedness. Population 1378 is a variable that includes population
in year 1378. Historic access include the accessibility variable. Border distances include Dist. to
borders. Trials (neighbours) are the trials in neighbour municipalities. Years: 1497, 1515, 1553,
1717, 1787, 1857, 1860, 1877, 1887, 1900, 1910, 1920, 1930, 1936, 1940, 1945, 1950, 1955, 1960,
1965, 1970, 1975, 1981, 1986, 1991.
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Table 13: Church jurisdiction: Municipal Level (Catalonia)
Dependent variable: Annual Population Growth (in %)
All trials Repressive trials Crypto-moral trials
All years Before 1860 All years Before 1860 All years Before 1860
Inquisition x After 0.055 -0.131** 0.075 -0.134** 0.316*** -0.028
(0.081) (0.063) (0.079) (0.061) (0.111) (0.067)
Inquisition 0.060 0.072 0.037 0.069 -0.071 -0.012
(0.069) (0.058) (0.066) (0.055) (0.093) (0.060)
After 0.037 0.012 -0.183** -0.131** -0.087* -0.006
(0.084) (0.074) (0.076) (0.066) (0.050) (0.036)
Observations 22,343 4,732 22,343 4,732 22,343 4,732
R-squared 0.219 0.162 0.220 0.163 0.219 0.161
Church Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Capital Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Population 1378 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geography Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Historic access Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Border distances Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Trials Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Dependent variable is annual population growth (in %). Columns with title All years include the whole
sample. Columns with title Before 1860 include a sub-sample for years before 1860. First two columns
include all types of trials. Columns under Crypto-moral trials only include trials against Judaism,
Lutheranism or Islam. Columns under Repressive trials include all trials excluding crypto-moral tri-
als. After is a dummy with value 1 after the first trial of the Inquisition occurs in a municipality or a
neighbour municipality, as defined in Section 4.3. Standard errors clustered at the town level. Church
is a dummy variable that identifies those municipalities under Church jurisdiction. Geography variables
include Altitude and ruggedness. Population 1378 is a variable that includes population in year 1378.
Historic access include the accessibility variable. Border distances include Dist. to borders. Trials (neigh-
bours) are the trials in neighbour municipalities. Years: 1497, 1515, 1553, 1717, 1787, 1857, 1860, 1877,
1887, 1900, 1910, 1920, 1930, 1936, 1940, 1945, 1950, 1955, 1960, 1965, 1970, 1975, 1981, 1986, 1991.
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Table 14: Previous trends: Municipal Level (Catalonia)
Dependent variable: Annual Population Growth (in %)
All trials Repressive trials Crypto-moral trials
All years Before 1860 All years Before 1860 All years Before 1860
Inquisition x After 0.046 -0.153* 0.050 -0.171* 0.299** 0.299**
(0.105) (0.090) (0.104) (0.090) (0.129) (0.129)
Inquisition x Before -0.046 -0.065 -0.112 -0.114 -0.026 -0.026
(0.119) (0.117) (0.122) (0.120) (0.157) (0.157)
Inquisition 0.075 0.094 0.066 0.106 -0.059 -0.059
(0.094) (0.086) (0.093) (0.085) (0.118) (0.118)
After 0.040 0.003 -0.214*** -0.157** -0.057 -0.057
(0.082) (0.074) (0.079) (0.064) (0.048) (0.048)
Observations 22,343 4,732 22,343 4,732 22,343 22,343
R-squared 0.217 0.161 0.217 0.162 0.217 0.217
Capital Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Population 1378 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geography Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Historic access Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Border distances Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Trials Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Dependent variable is annual population growth (in %). Columns with title All years include
the whole sample. Columns with title Before 1860 include a sub-sample for years before 1860.
First two columns include all types of trials. Columns under Crypto-moral trials only include
trials against Judaism, Lutheranism or Islam. Columns under Repressive trials include all trials
excluding crypto-moral trials. After is a dummy with value 1 after the first trial of the Inquisition
occurs in a municipality or a neighbour municipality, as defined in Section 4.3. Before is a dummy
variable for the period before the first trial occurred in a municipality. Standard errors clustered at
the town level. Geography variables include Altitude and ruggedness. Population 1378 is a variable
that includes population in year 1378. Historic access include the accessibility variable. Border
distances include Dist. to borders. Trials (neighbours) are the trials in neighbour municipalities.
Years: 1497, 1515, 1553, 1717, 1787, 1857, 1860, 1877, 1887, 1900, 1910, 1920, 1930, 1936, 1940,
1945, 1950, 1955, 1960, 1965, 1970, 1975, 1981, 1986, 1991.
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Table 15: Dynamics: Municipal Level (Catalonia)
Dependent variable: Annual Population Growth (in %)
All trials Repressive trials Crypto-moral trials
All years Before 1860 All years Before 1860 All years Before 1860
Inquisition x After1 -0.120** -0.119** -0.122** -0.137** -0.090 -0.090
(0.057) (0.056) (0.056) (0.055) (0.099) (0.099)
Inquisition x After2 -0.018 -0.131** -0.020 -0.160*** -0.259*** -0.259***
(0.080) (0.052) (0.081) (0.053) (0.090) (0.090)
Inquisition x After3 0.123* -0.226*** 0.135** -0.351*** 0.163 0.163
(0.063) (0.052) (0.066) (0.087) (0.101) (0.101)
Observations 22,343 4,732 22,343 4,732 22,343 22,343
R-squared 0.217 0.162 0.217 0.163 0.218 0.218
Capital Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Population 1378 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geography Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Historic access Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Border distances Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Trials Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Dependent variable is annual population growth (in %). Columns with title All years include the whole
sample. Columns with title Before 1860 include a sub-sample for years before 1860. First two columns
include all types of trials. Columns under Crypto-moral trials only include trials against Judaism,
Lutheranism or Islam. Columns under Repressive trials include all trials excluding crypto-moral tri-
als. After1 is a dummy with value 1 for the period just after the first trial of the Inquisition occurs in
a municipality or a neighbour municipality. After2 is a dummy variable for the second period after the
first trial occurs. After3 is a dummy variable for the rest of the periods after the first trial. Standard
errors clustered at the town level. Geography variables include Altitude and ruggedness. Population
1378 is a variable that includes population in year 1378. Historic access include the accessibility variable.
Border distances include Dist. to borders. Trials (neighbours) are the trials in neighbour municipalities.
Years: 1497, 1515, 1553, 1717, 1787, 1857, 1860, 1877, 1887, 1900, 1910, 1920, 1930, 1936, 1940, 1945,
1950, 1955, 1960, 1965, 1970, 1975, 1981, 1986, 1991.
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Table 16: Dynamics II: Municipal Level (Catalonia)
Dependent variable: Annual Population Growth (in %)
All trials Repressive trials Crypto-moral trials
Inquisition x After -0.274** -0.251** 0.006
(0.120) (0.126) (0.152)
Inquisition x After x Influence 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Inquisition 0.053 0.032 -0.078
(0.069) (0.066) (0.096)
After 0.099 -0.112 -0.051
(0.087) (0.081) (0.052)
Observations 22,343 22,343 22,343
R-squared 0.218 0.219 0.218
Capital Yes Yes Yes
Population 1378 Yes Yes Yes
Geography Yes Yes Yes
County FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Historic access Yes Yes Yes
Border distances Yes Yes Yes
Trials Yes Yes Yes
Dependent variable is annual population growth (in %). First column includes all types of
trials. Column under Crypto-moral trials only includes trials against Judaism, Lutheranism
or Islam. Column under Repressive trials includes all trials excluding crypto-moral trials.
Standard errors clustered at the town level. Influence reports the number of years after the
first trial occurred in a municipality. Geography variables include Altitude and ruggedness.
Population 1378 is a variable that includes population in year 1378. Historic access include
the accessibility variable. Border distances include Dist. to borders. Trials (neighbours)
are the trials in neighbour municipalities. Years: 1497, 1515, 1553, 1717, 1787, 1857, 1860,
1877, 1887, 1900, 1910, 1920, 1930, 1936, 1940, 1945, 1950, 1955, 1960, 1965, 1970, 1975,
1981, 1986, 1991.
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Table 17: Patents and Inquisition: Regional Level
Dependent variable: Number of patents
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Trials per Year -2.6038 -6.8616 -6.8769*** -6.3997***
(6.2848) (13.0013) (1.2840) (1.7845)
Linear Time Trend 2.2648*** 2.2651*** 2.2634*** 2.2660***
(0.1318) (0.1317) (0.1315) (0.1317)
Initial Urbanization 733.3616*** 720.6102***
(50.6286) (60.5033)
Initial Population -0.000
(0.0001)
Geographic Variables Yes Yes Yes
Obs 1,105 1,105 1,105 1,105
Dependent variable is the number of patents produced in a year. Sample covers 1850-2000.
Trials per year are the average number of trials per region during the period 1478-1808.
Initial population and urbanization are from 1530. Geographic variables include latitude,
longitude, area. Standard errors are in parentheses.
48
Table 18: Levels of Trust and Attitudes towards Scientific Advances: Regional Advances
Dependent variable Coefficient for Inquisitorial Trials (in 1,000) Observations
Mistrust of Government -0.024*** 969
(0.009)
Mistrust of Parliament -0.017* 957
(0.009)
Mistrust of Justice System 0.006 425
(0.012)
Mistrust of Friends 0.029 546
(0.024)
Mistrust of People You First Meet 0.024 551
(0.018)
Opinion on Scientific Advances 0.035*** 929
(0.009)
Scientific Advances (1 if they will help) -0.015*** 929
(0.006)
Dependent variable is the answer to the question regarding Mistrust levels. For example Mistrust level
of government goes from 1-5 where 1 represents the highest level of trust and 5 the highest mistrust level
of government. Opinion on scientific advances takes the value of 1 if the respondent thinks scientific
advances will help development, 2 if she thinks scientific advances will both harm and help development
and 3 if she thinks they will harm development. Scientific advances is a dummy where 0 represents
values 2 and 3 in the previous answer. The table shows the Trials coefficient, that is the association
between the number of trials that occurred in the region where the respondent lives and her answer to
the survey. World Value Surveys were done between 2000 and 2005. Control variables include age, age
square, dummy variables for educational attainment, size of the town where the respondent is living and
socio-economic status.
Table 19: Levels of Trust and Attitudes towards Scientific Advances: Province level
Scientific Advances Parliament Justice Army Church Government Political parties People
Trials (in 1,000) -0.014** 0.210** -0.232** -0.053 0.006 0.006 0.203*** 0.0003
(0.007) (0.088) (0.104) (0.081) (0.071) (0.104) (0.072) (0.006)
Observations 9,184 2,138 1,472 2,138 2,138 682 1,348 9,184
R-squared 0.397 0.077 0.091 0.056 0.085 0.120 0.070 0.189
Dependent variable is the answer to the question regarding Mistrust levels. For example Mistrust level of government
goes from 1-5 where 1 represents the highest level of trust and 5 the highest mistrust level of government. Scientific
advances is a dummy that is 0 if the respondent thinks scientific advances will harm in some way economic development.
The table shows the Trials coefficient, that is the association between the number of trials that occurred in the province
where the respondent lives and her answer to the survey. CIS Surveys included were completed before 2007. Control
variables include year of the survey dummy, age, age square, dummy variables for educational attainment, size of the
town where the respondent is living and socio-economic status. Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 20: Electoral polarization and Inquisition: Provincial Level
Dependent variable: political polarization
(1) (2) (3)
All trials 0.0095
(0.006)
Repressive trials -0.0022
(0.001)
Crypto-moral trials 0.0018
(0.001)
Observations 336 336 336
R-squared 0.276 0.276 0.276
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Province FE Yes Yes Yes
Population Yes Yes Yes
Geography Yes Yes Yes
Political polarization is the dependent variable. It is
calculated using the number of seats of the Parlia-
ment obtained by each party in each province and
Montalvo and Reynal-Querol polarization measure.
Crypto-moral trials only include trials against Ju-
daism, Lutheranism or Islam. Repressive trials in-
clude all trials excluding crypto-moral trials. Stan-
dard errors clustered at the province level. Geogra-
phy variables include latitude, longitude, and area.
50
Table 21: Cultural Centers and Inquisition: Municipal Level (Barcelona province)
Dependent variable: Existence of cultural center
All trials Repressive trials Crypto-moral trials
Trials -0.017*** -0.007 -0.037***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.009)
Observations 308 308 308
R-squared 0.352 0.389 0.314
Capital Yes Yes Yes
Population Yes Yes Yes
Geography Yes Yes Yes
County FE Yes Yes Yes
Historic access Yes Yes Yes
Border distances Yes Yes Yes
Trials (neighbours) Yes Yes Yes
Dependent variable is the existence of a cultural center between
1850 and 1930. Crypto-moral trials only include trials against
Judaism, Lutheranism or Islam. Repressive trials include all trials
excluding crypto-moral trials. Standard errors clustered at the
town level. Geography variables include Altitude and ruggedness.
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Appendix A Summary Statistics: Municipal level including Barcelona
No Inquisition Inquisition (1)-(2) t
Trials 7.681
(75.209)
Annual Growth (1378-1991) 0.276 0.331 -0.055*** -15.404
(0.236) (0.255) (0.004)
Area (km2) 29.781 38.784 -9.003*** -3.980
(28.988) (39.914) (2.262)
Population in 1378 112.957 355.000 -242.043*** -3.492
(127.133) (1527.196) (69.318)
Density in 1378 5.467 13.100 -7.633** -3.232
(6.732) (51.759) (2.362)
Church 0.288 0.257 0.032 1.090
(0.453) (0.437) (0.029)
Dist. to main rivers (m) 4926.800 6087.940 -1161.140* -2.070
(8493.699) (8706.169) (560.903)
Dist. to rivers (m) 3484.269 4173.426 -689.158 -1.453
(7427.669) (7090.587) (474.209)
Dist. Navigable rivers (m) 19121.890 18700.376 421.514 0.301
(21686.742) (21153.099) (1398.414)
Dist. Maritime routes (m) 43541.974 39703.315 3838.659 1.645
(34275.450) (37311.891) (2333.684)
Distance to Ports (m) 38820.772 35412.972 3407.800 1.513
(33371.297) (35721.047) (2252.371)
Distance to Roads (m) 1818.279 1716.999 101.280 0.516
(2895.344) (3125.562) (196.275)
Distance to intersection (m) 9561.370 8459.941 1101.428* 2.170
(7867.942) (7679.237) (507.496)
Number of intersections 0.043 0.126 -0.083*** -3.509
(0.213) (0.475) (0.024)
Distance to France (m) 78543.620 71503.290 7040.330* 2.199
(52527.781) (45040.534) (3202.039)
Distance to Sea (m) 40683.872 37274.987 3408.885 1.444
(34720.065) (37688.511) (2360.447)
Distance to Interior (m) 87709.808 99970.446 -12260.638** -3.269
(57774.467) (57171.360) (3750.854)
Accessibility 0.425 0.426 -0.000 -0.011
(0.128) (0.127) (0.008)
Latitude 41.718 41.754 -0.036 -1.313
(0.440) (0.401) (0.028)
Longitude 1.669 1.844 -0.176*** -3.432
(0.804) (0.764) (0.051)
Ruggedness 36.824 35.473 1.351 0.844
(25.147) (23.849) (1.601)
Altitude 479.138 433.278 45.860 1.684
(431.709) (401.381) (27.236)
Observations 490 452
No Inquisition is the sample of municipalities that did not experience a trial of the Inquisition.
Inquisition is the sample of municipalities that experienced at least one trial of the Inquisition.
Annual growth is annual population growth during the period 1378-1991. Density in 1378 is the
population in 1378 divided by area. Church is the proportion of municipalities of each group
that were under the jurisdiction of the Church. Distances are in meters. Distance to intersection
is the minimum distance of a municipality to the closest intersection of Roman roads. Distance
to Regions is the minimmum distance between a municipality and the border of Catalunya with
Aragon or Valencia. Accessibility is an index of how accessible was a municipality in Roman times.
See De Soto (2010).
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Appendix B The Spanish Inquisition in Catalonia
Figure 9: Trials in 1497
Figure 10: Trials in 1553
Figure 11: Trials in 1787
Figure 12: Trials in 1515
Figure 13: Trials in 1717
Figure 14: Trials in 1857
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Appendix C Crypto-moral trials in Catalonia
Figure 15: Crypto-moral trials in 1497
Figure 16: Crypto-moral trials in 1553
Figure 17: Crypto-moral trials in 1787
Figure 18: Crypto-moral trials in 1515
Figure 19: Crypto-moral trials in 1717
Figure 20: Crypto-moral trials in 1857
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Appendix D Repressive trials in Catalonia
Figure 21: Repressive trials in 1497
Figure 22: Repressive trials in 1553
Figure 23: Repressive trials in 1787
Figure 24: Repressive trials in 1515
Figure 25: Repressive trials in 1717
Figure 26: Repressive trials in 1857
55
Appendix E Population density in Catalonia
Figure 27: Density in 1497
Figure 28: Density in 1553
Figure 29: Density in 1787
Figure 30: Density in 1515
Figure 31: Density in 1717
Figure 32: Density in 1857
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Appendix F Roman routes and accessibility, ruggedness, rivers
Figure 33: Altitude (m) in Catalonia
Goerlich (2010)
Figure 34: Accessibility in Roman times
DeSoto (2010)
Figure 35: Map municipal accessibility in
Roman era
DeSoto
(2010)
Figure 36: Ruggedness
Goerlich (2010)
Figure 37: Roman roads
DeSoto2010
Figure 38: Main rivers in Catalonia
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